Editor Silke Jacobi reflects on the significance of Frans Vosman’s essential notion of ‘minima moralia’ for her master thesis on contemporary institutional aspects as well as in her professional practice.
The passing away of Frans Vosman last year entails an indescribable loss to me. Attempting to refer to parts of his intellectual heritage anew renders the pain and the loss palpable. Personal contact and contact by way of intellectual considerations: those two dimensions of interaction with a person may stem from totally different points of departure.
Congruency between a person and his intellectual work is a precious – and I presume, an even rarer – good. I experienced this congruency in the thesis-supervision and lectures from Frans Vosman as well as in work (as a member of the editorial board of this website) and encounters with him. This paves the way for reflections on elements of his care-ethical heritage without continuously stumbling upon discrepancies between idealized – ethical – statements and complex practices.
Moral theory, practice and idea
And still a struggle is to be part of my reflections. This struggle then refers to the care-ethical balancing between avoiding to apply idealistic principles, too remote from concrete practices, and risking to generate new conclusions – even if by preferred qualitative, subject-orientated research – that are implicitly moralistic.
Frans Vosman’s awareness of these constraints moves me as a care ethical theorist and as a practitioner. Immediately the concerned remarks of Frans Vosman come to mind, telling to delineate carefully scientific (research) practice from social work.
Although this would be advisable for obvious reasons, the two contrasting professional disciplines do share the same – moral – concerns. The professionals of the two disciplines, the scholar and the practitioner, are able to inform each other, notwithstanding the discrepancies in their societal positions.
With his specific view on the wide contemporary context, and variety and consequences of societal positions, Frans Vosman mentored the master thesis I wrote, concerning the impact of power dynamics on institutional care in late modernity. His approach paved the way for me to explore aspects of this era full of contradictions in relation to care-issues.
The practitioner and moral theory
As a practitioner in the field of institutional support for socially distressed citizens, I fully appreciate the approach of Frans Vosman as it does not negate any tension occurring, as I will illustrate by the following example.
‘Being available’ is a core characteristic, contributing to my professionalism as a practitioner. However, ethical theory of all kind exposes social practitioners to (moral) judgement, with just as many useful as painful sides to it. The pain then, consists of the perception of being left to oneself with institutional, societal and eventually personal contradictions which are often not reflected in either moral theory or policy (the latter sometimes arising from the former).
The inquiry frame
In the empirical and theoretical research of Frans Vosman I find descriptions of feasible socio-ethical dispositions (‘real-time, here and now morality”, Vosman, 2018, p.13) beyond (implicit compelling) moral claims.
‘Minima moralia’ comprises one of the main premises of his work (2018). His alertness to obfuscating, implicitly morally laden terminology (of all kinds, care-ethical terminology in itself not excluded, Vosman, 2020) and a broad understanding of contextualization, offer me an anchor point. In itself not at all an intellectual home to rest peacefully. Rather a means to face contradictions in (moral) theory, empirical questions and also practices, without disregarding the tensions that are thereby revealed.
This strongly hints at the heuristic significance of fields of tension for care-ethics (idem, 2018a), even if the primary aim could roughly be described as the opposite, namely to identify various forms of (caring) cohesions between citizens. Regarding this approach, the questioning of impeding, conflicting societal and political conditions may become a crucial part of the investigation.
After all, the qualitative skilled scientific investigator ‘undergoes’ an inquiry, namely in the sense referred to by Frans Vosman (2018a ). The investigators then stay in the field of inquiry ‘involved with skin and bones’ (Vosman, 2018b, p. 17, note 10) for an extended period of time, and to a certain extent exposed also to the ‘raw’ aspects of knowledge to be acquired.
Contextualization, power and institutions
Then, finally a ‘moralistic’ way out of a confrontation with tensions could possibly be found, yet also a complicated epistemological one, where the latter yields more questions. It sheds light on epistemic problems with the ambition to explore the ‘pure’ first person perspective. (Vosman, 2018, p. 68). How about the real impact of – upon closer investigation – hidden and ambivalent messages, so inherent to (Western) socio-political policy in late-modernity?
Political orders, policy-formulation, societal power distributions and the presence, absence or deforming of institutions are all interwoven. Therefore causalities are much more difficult to identify. The emphasis of Frans Vosman on societal and institutional complexity within the ambiguity and pitfalls of the late-modernity points in my view to the political dimension that characterizes his work in a specific way.
The scientific benefit of the care-ethically preferred qualitative-empirically research-direction has the – to a certain extend intended – side-effect of ‘voicing’ the unheard powerless in society. At the same time, the meticulous inquiry of the societal and political context, as Frans Vosman introduced it to care ethics (informed by the sociological work of selected “fellow travelers”), prevents one from getting lost in simplifications. For instance, as in reducing the power-theme by focusing on the inadequateness of (care-)institutions without a wider politico-ethical contextualization.
Contested institutions and inquiry
Instead, burning societal issues are to be inquired by very careful differentiation: between constructive intentions of care-workers, the ambiguities of the citizen in need themselves, obstructive (hierarchical) institutional positions and a nevertheless emancipatory (ethical) policy which is manifesting itself in a contradictory practice.
For this reason the complex late modernity causes fading possibilities for allocations of responsibility and power in society (Vosman & Niemeijer, 2017). The exploration of the ‘first-person-perspective’ requires embedding in this, at first sight, overwhelming context (Vosman, 2018). In this respect there are more ‘unheard powerless’ then it seems at first sight.
The ‘morally good’ care-taker with alleged absence of (inter-)personal struggling or the ‘morally failing’ care-taker who does not sufficiently align with the patient: both conclusions do not reflect the intertwining of external and internal aspects which are at stake. Frans Vosman once mentioned to me that a care-ethical conceptualization regarding institutions in the light of this context is still lacking.
From the inside of Dutch institutional residential youth care, he (and other authors) conducted a long-term qualitative-empirical study, containing precise observations of the interactions between social workers and the residential young persons with learning disabilities (Vosman, 2017).
Very briefly summarized, the results indicated that care-institutions have a specific capability to be societal inclusive, mediated through the social workers, while being framed by social-policy as exclusionary. The institutional worker had a complex range of tasks in a contested working environment, influenced by contradictory social policies.
To undergo the practice
As practitioner in the social field, as social worker on the work floor, I hold a position that catapults me towards the edge of a power play as above denoted. Yet at the same time it pulls me towards its gravitational center. The latter happens when it comes to the underlying dynamics, that the social workers are, in the end, the ones who have to keep things running for the person in need of care.
Within this complexity and ambiguity one may catch a glimpse of ‘undergoing’ a personal stance that is not naturally related to ‘passivity’. Rather, if being receptive to this, to ‘heuristic exercises’ without avoiding a whole range of conflicting findings. In addition the own personal ambivalences come along. To a certain extent accepting to being pulled into a power play, but also resisting the gravity, directing again to the care-receiver.
Research on moral stress in the professional social sector acknowledges the involvement of these emotions through personal striking confrontations within an erratic and overwhelming context.
This all indicates an ‘undergoing’ that is intertwined with the enhancement of practical (social professional) wisdom (a term established by Frans Vosman & Andries Baart). The heuristic feature of ‘going through a situation’ before identifying the essential aspects of it can be inherent to both dimensions, the scientific and the practical, albeit that the results vary of course.
Furthermore, those results are retrieved in different social positions. However, the clearness about the possible heuristic benefits of (sometimes confronting) ‘undergoing’ is one of the philosophical gifts I got from Frans Vosman.
The heuristic benefit and ‘minima moralia’
Undergoing (in both dimensions) whilst aiming at ‘minima moralia’ is basically – please also note the differences – a process equal to nuclear research which gets closer and closer to investigative goals to finally conclude that the atoms consist of again smaller components which exist in two or more states at the same time. But whereas the nuclear researcher can be fascinated by these confusing findings from a scientific distance, the qualitative empirical investigator remains in the field of investigation for a longer time with “skin and bones”.
I want to illustrate this with again a personal remembrance: not long ago I was exhausted as a result of institutional work in the midst of a social system which is supposed to be one of the most elaborated in the world. But even then, as a side-effect, it suffers from the various power dynamics as described above. It had affected me as a frontline social professional. Now I got offered a new job in an explicitly de-institutionalized, but also socio-political controversial setting. This job-offer caused me some worries against the background of my previous experience.
When I got the chance to talk about my hesitation with Frans Vosman, he said: “Yes, but it also can be interesting”. Firstly, I got stimulated to start a ‘non-normative inquiry’. Secondly, the word ‘yes’ I may confidently interpret as a respectful response with respect to my experiences as ‘social practitioner’.
The social professional as participant and the researcher
Furthermore, I will then add a possibly for the reader unexpected term which is, as far as I know, not worked out theoretically by Frans Vosman, even if I heard him using it in some context – please note: different from the context in which I locate the term now.
The term I am referring to is ‘solidarity’, and as I am applying this term carefully and hesitantly, I am also aware that this could lead to new moralistic, idealized claims, distorting the ‘minima moralia’ premises. Even well-intentioned normative (policy) expression can have a reverse, compelling side or a misleading appearance.
But solidarity could also be the expression of an alertness to the consequences of the diversity of ‘undergone’ societal positions. This alertness would then be a ‘moral attitude’, or rather a political sensitivity acquired ‘with skin and bones’. This means referring to the similarities and differences with the whole spectrum of one’s own experiences.
Prudence in empirical normative inquiry requires to bring the impact and wide contextualization of moral terminology into the field of vision. The social professional (in the field of institutional care and support practice) in late modernity might perceive this as a rapprochement to his or her own ambiguity, to the contradictory position, to the contextual pitfalls and to his or her potential exposure to moral stress.
An elaborated care-ethical conceptualizing of (social) institutions could benefit from the wider contextualization as well. The recent alarming incidents around institutions in for instance the US, Germany and the Netherlands point out the urgency.
Vosman, F. & Niemeijer, A. (2017). Rethinking critical reflection on care: late modern uncertainty and the implications for care ethics. DOI 10.1007/s11019-017-9766-1
Kolen, M., Vosman, F., Timmerman, G., Baart, A. (2017). Alledaagse omgang tussen zorgprofessionals en zorgontvangers als vindplaats voor goede (LVB) zorg. Journal of Social Intervention: Theory and Practice. Volume 26 -3, 28 – 49
Vosman, F. & Baart, A. (2008). Aannemelijke zorg. Over het uitzieden en verdringen van praktische wijsheid in de gezondheidszorg. Den Haag: Boom Lemma
Vosman, F.H.J. (2018a). The moral relevance of lived experience. Ethicsofcare.org
Vosman, F. (2018b). Overleven als levensvorm. Zorgethiek op het kritiek op het geslaagde leven. Uitgeverij Net aan Zet (Utrecht) English translation forthcoming.
Vosman, F. (2020). The disenchantment of care ethics: A critical cartography. In F. Vosman, A. Baart, & J. Hoffman (Eds.), The ethics of care: the state of the art (pp. 17-63). In Ethics of Care Series. Louvain: Peeters Publishers